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Abstract 
 
 
Infectious livestock disease creates externalities for proximate animal production 
enterprises. The distribution of production scale within a region should influence and be 
influenced by these disease externalities. Taking the distribution of the unit costs of stocking an 
animal as primitive, we show that an increase in the variance of these unit costs reduces 
consumer surplus. The effect on producer surplus, total surplus, and animal concentration across 
feedlots depends on the demand elasticity. A subsidy to smaller herds can reduce social welfare 
and immiserize the farm sector by increasing the extent of disease. While Nash behavior 
involves excessive stocking, disease effects can be such that aggregate output declines relative to 
first-best. Disease externalities can induce more adoption of a cost-reducing technology by larger 
herds so that animals become more concentrated across herds. For strategic reasons, excess 
overall adoption of the innovation may occur. Larger herds are also more likely to adopt 
biosecurity innovations, explaining why larger herds may be less diseased in equilibrium.  
 
Keywords: agricultural industrialization, biosecurity, inefficiency, Nash behavior, 
overinvestment, technology adoption.  
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Infectious disease survives more readily when hosts congregate. It is widely believed that many 
zoonotic diseases transferred to humans when humans commenced living in cities large enough 
to sustain the infectious agents despite deaths and the acquisition of immunity (McNeill 1976). 
Cities provide economic opportunities through scale and agglomeration economies but, for most 
of urban history, at an increased risk of disease. Urban population centers grew largely because 
of migration from rural hinterlands. In recent times, public works, including water and sewage 
works, and other public health measures have allowed longer life spans in the cities of a growing 
number of countries.1   
In livestock agriculture, there has been a similar trade-off between scale economies and 
infectious disease. Densely housed animals and birds may be fed and cared for at a 
comparatively low unit cost, but also at the risk of production losses through mortality and 
morbidity.2 Industrial streamlining and animal healthcare innovations have caused an increase in 
the efficient herd size. In animal healthcare, these innovations include the availability of 
commercial herds known to be free of a specific disease, housing systems that better secure 
against disease entry, sanitation technologies, and the use of antibiotics.  
                                                 
1 Densely crowded locations with populations in transit, e.g., hospitals, continue to be common 
infection sites (Gaydos et al. 2006; McDonald, Owings, and Jernigan 2006). 
2 For evidence on this relationship when the infection agent is bovine viral diarrhea virus 
(BVDV), see Houe et al. (1995) and Valle et al. (1999). This disease causes lower milk output, 
reproduction rates and growth rates, as well as deaths among young stock and earlier culling. For 
the effect of housing density on the general health and growth rate of dairy calves, see Svensson 
and Liberg (2006). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (2001) surveyed feedlots and found that 
larger feedlots had higher incidence of all six diseases reported in the survey summary. This is 
despite evidence that larger feedlots took more precautions. One of these diseases is bovine 
respiratory disease complex, a condition of major economic concern in the United States. 
Thomsen et al. (2006) report higher risk of mortality from any cause among larger dairy herds. 
See, too, Rushen (2001), who has surveyed the literature on production losses in dairying due to 
diseases associated with confinement, such as lameness and mastitis. Kossaibati and Esslemont 
(1997) reported that 36% of lameness cases in 90 English dairy herds they studied were due to 
some infectious disease. 
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A large literature exists on cost-benefit analysis for animal diseases, but very little has been 
written about the economic externalities that infectious diseases give rise to. For infectious 
human diseases, Kremer (1996) and Geoffard and Philipson (1996) do model private behavioral 
incentives. The public good dimension to infectious animal diseases was recognized by Ekboir 
(1999). For vineyards, Brown, Lynch, and Zilberman (2002) study optimal private and public 
efforts to control a spatially propagated plant disease but do not consider interactions across 
farms. A related literature is on the optimal management of exotic species; see Mumford (2002), 
Olson and Roy (2002), and Perrings (2005). This literature is most concerned with whether to 
stamp out an invasion and, if so, how to stamp it out. It has not addressed interacting behavior 
across affected enterprises for a disease that is already well established. 
Two issues are addressed in Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen (2005). The consequences of 
trade in feeder livestock are considered when such trade increases the overall level of losses from 
disease. In addition, scale of production as a risk factor for disease entry is considered in a model 
without accounting for behavior on other farms, i.e., that holds the disease to be an exogenous 
risk. Hennessy (2006) provides a dynamic model of disease management in which disease 
spillover externalities are modeled and regulation can be through punishment for becoming 
infected. This study finds that a certain technology class, namely, technologies that increase the 
probability a herd becomes free of a disease, is welfare reducing. The paper does not model herd 
structure heterogeneity. 
The questions addressed in this paper concern how herd structure, disease losses, and 
technology choices relate in a livestock production region. At the center of the paper’s problem 
are adverse disease spillovers across herds. It is assumed that farms decide farm stock numbers 
privately according to Nash behavior, taking these disease spillovers as given. In the absence of 
further technology adoption opportunities, it is shown that greater dispersion in unit stocking 
costs across the region likely reduces market output and consumer surplus. But overall social 
welfare may increase because smaller herds become increasingly marginalized and this leads to 
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lower stocking costs in the aggregate. The demand function’s slope determines, in large part, 
whether total surplus rises or falls.  
It is also shown that a poll tax on small herds can decrease region output, decrease region 
costs, and increase region welfare. But a poll tax on larger herds will immiserize producers in the 
aggregate because production is diverted toward less-efficient farms. Somewhat anomalous 
results arise because smaller farms are stocked too heavily since more disease effects are external 
to them. Overall, a tragedy-of-the-commons occurs whereby the average stocking rate is too high 
in the region. But some large herds may be stocked below first-best, again because smaller farms 
take least account of disease externalities. In light of the fact that average stocking under first-
best is lower than under Nash behavior and the latter incurs more disease loss, it is not immediate 
as to whether aggregate output under first-best is larger. In fact, it need not be larger in our 
model. 
Cost-reducing technologies are also considered. The stocking decision and the extent of 
technology adoption are shown to complement when the technology involves a high fixed-cost 
component. This is despite non-complementary interactions from the stocking decisions of other 
farms. Thus, technology may better enable larger farms to become larger still. It is shown too 
that the extent of technology adoption will be socially excessive because farms adopt in part so 
as to discourage stocking and disease spillovers from other farms.  
The paper also considers choices over a technology that reduces exposure to a disease, i.e., a 
biosecurity technology. Here too it is shown that larger farms are more likely to adopt. Despite 
the built-in negative technical relation between feedlot size and output per farm for given 
technical choices, larger feedlots may have larger outputs. The stronger incentive to adopt 
biosecurity technologies makes the difference. The inclusion of biosecurity technology choices 
in the model explains some peculiarities in United States hog and dairy productivity data, to be 
discussed shortly.  
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This paper is sequenced as follows. After presenting and discussing some aggregate data, the 
main model is laid out. The model is solved under Nash behavior and under first-best choices. 
Cost-reducing and biosecurity technologies are introduced in separate sections. A short 
discussion concludes. 
 
Some Data on Scale and Productivity 
By contrast with many European countries, it is only recently that the United States has 
commenced systematic surveys of actual farm production and financial performance. 
Agricultural Resources and Management Survey data were collected for dairy production 
enterprises in 2000 and 2004. Short (2004) has reported and analyzed data from the 2000 survey, 
and table 1 extracts data from tables 4 and 5 of that report. Output per cow increases with an 
increase in herd size, while labor and feed technical efficiency ratios also improve. These 
efficiencies are likely due in part to technology choices that only larger herds can justify making. 
Regarding other technology choice issues, producers with larger herds are also keener to adopt 
practices that are likely to have a large fixed-cost component. But in spite of evidence that larger 
farms take more precaution with respect to veterinary medicine practices, veterinary expenses do 
not display a definite pattern. Points to note are that producers with larger herds may have access 
to their own veterinarian and are likely to obtain bulk discounts on drugs.  
Table 2 reports pigs per litter in U.S. sow herds, by size of operation. Data are from various 
issues of the USDA Quarterly Hogs and Pigs reports. Other technical statistics, such as feed 
conversion efficiency, would perhaps be more telling, but the author knows of no source for 
these statistics over time and by size of operation. The smallest size category is now of no 
commercial significance while 7.2 was a more typical reported average litter size circa 1996 for 
that smallest category. Large herds report higher technical efficiency, on average. As with dairy 
herds, one interpretation of this data is that producers with larger herds have better access to 
superior genetics. Another is that the disease disadvantages faced by producers with the larger 
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sow herd when using a given technology base are overcome by scale economies in the adoption 
of technologies that assist in better securing the herd against production losses due to disease. 
Most likely both of these effects, as well as some other effects, contribute to the difference in 
performance. 
 
Model 
Inverse market demand for a livestock product is given as ( )P Q . This is a weakly decreasing 
function, i.e., ( ) 0P Q′ ≤ . On the supply side, the market is comprised of N  farms, 3N ≥ , in 
each of M  disease regions where M  is a large number. We require M  to be large so that price-
taking behavior can be assumed. Each farm has a constant unit cost of production. The disease 
regions are replicas of each other so that in each region the nth farm has unit stocking cost nc . 
Since the M  regions are replicas, only one of these regions needs to be considered in detail, and 
notation identifying the region can be discarded. Farms are identified as {1, ... , }n N∈  N≡ Ω . 
In the baseline model, the only action taken by the nth farm is the number of animals 
stocked, denoted by na . Quantity na  shall be referred to as feedlot or herd size or scale. Because 
of communicable disease, output per animal falls with the number of animals in one’s own herd 
and with the number of other animals in the disease region. These effects are captured in linear 
form by specifying output per animal as 
(1) ,\ 0 1 2 \ \( ; ) ; ;Nni i i i i n
n i
q a A a A A aα α α ∈Ω
≠
= − − =∑  
where 0 0α >  and 1 2 0α α≥ ≥ . Inequality 1 2α α≥  is intended to capture imperfect disease 
spillovers from other farms. Output on the ith feedlot is, therefore, 
(2) 2\ 0 1 2 \( ; ) .i i i i i i iq a A a a a a Aα α α= − −  
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The first two right-hand terms, 20 1i ia aα α− , provide a quadratic farm production function. The 
remaining term, 2 \i ia Aα− , represents the negative externality that is imposed on this farm by 
other farms in the region.  
Output per region is \( ; )
N
n n nn
q a A a∈Ω∑ , market output is \( ; )N n n nnQ M q a A a∈Ω= ∑ , and 
market price is  
(3) ( )\( ; ) .
N
n n nn
P P M q a A a∈Ω= ∑  
To establish welfare effects in equilibrium, it is necessary to characterize the implications of 
disease externalities for behavior. 
 
Nash Equilibrium 
The ith farm profit is \( ; )i i i i i iPq a A a c aπ = − . If the grower behaves according to Nash 
conjectures by taking the behavior of other growers as given, then the grower chooses to  
(4) 20 1 2 \max max .i ia i a i i i i i iP a P a P a A c aπ α α α= − − −  
With (1/ )
N
nn
a N a∈Ω= ∑ , Nash optimality conditions identify pure-strategy solutions to this 
system of equations as *,i Na i∈Ω :  
(5) 
* * *0 0
0 1 0 1
0 1 2 1 1 2
; ;
2 ; 2 ( 1).
i i
i
c c P c c c P ca a a
PK PK PK PK
K K N
α α
α α α α
− − − −= + = + =
≡ − ≡ + −
 
These solutions are held to be interior, i.e., it is assumed that unit stocking costs support * 0ia >  
Ni∀ ∈Ω . 
Notice that the stocking rate on small farms is more elastic with respect to price than the 
stocking rate on large farms. This is because smaller farms are operating on a smaller margin and 
a price increase is proportionately more significant. Upon making substitutions and 
cancellations,  
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(6) 
* * 1 1 0 2 1
\ 0
1 0
* * * 0 1 1 1 2 1 0
\ 2
1 0 1
2
1 1 0 2 1
0 2 2 2
0 1 0 0
( )( ) ( )( )(6 ) ( ; ) ;
( ) ( )( ) ( )(6 ) ( ; )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) .
i
i i
i
i i i
i i i
K P c c ca q a A
PK PK
P K c c c P cb q a A a
K K P K
c c K P c c c c c
PK K P K P K
α α α αα
α α α α α α
α α α αα
− − − −= − +
⎡ ⎤+ − − − −= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
− − − − − −+ − +
 
Bearing in mind that 
N
nn
N c c∈Ω=∑ , aggregate output in the disease region is 
(7) 
( )* * * * * * * * *\ \ \
2 2
2 20 1 0 2 1
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 0
1( ; ) ( ; ) Cov ( ; ),
( ) ( ) ( ) 1; Var( ) ( ) .
N N N
N
n n n n n n n n nn n n
c
c n nn
q a A a q a A a N q a A a
N
P c N P c N c N c c c
P K P K P K N
α α α α α σ σ
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω
∈Ω
= +
− − −= + + ≡ ≡ −
∑ ∑ ∑
∑
 
Aggregate output is * * * *\( ; )
N
n n nn
Q M q a A a∈Ω= ∑ . Since 2 1α α≤ , for a given output price, then an 
increase in the variance of unit costs leads to a decline in aggregate output. This is because more 
dispersion in unit stocking costs leads to more dispersion in herd sizes. From eqn. (5), an 
implication of the model is that (conditional on a fixed output price) average herd size is 
independent of unit cost variance. But eqn. (1) identifies declining output per animal in larger 
herds.3 Aggregate output, and so average output per animal, declines with larger variance in unit 
stocking costs. Why this is so is clear from studying the covariance term in eqn. (7), where 
(8) 
* * *
\ 1 2
0 0
( ; ) 10; 0;n n n
c ci i
fixed fixed
q a A a
c PK c PK
α α∂ ∂−= ≥ = − ≤∂ ∂  
so that * * *\Cov( ( ; ), ) 0n n nq a A a ≤ . Output per animal is larger on farms with high unit stocking costs 
while feedlot scale is lower on these farms. This is compatible with some experimental data—see 
Svensson and Liberg (2006)—but is not consistent with the data reported in tables 1 and 2. 
Notwithstanding eqn. (8) above, (6b) and a straightforward computation confirm that a farm with 
an above-average unit stocking cost has a below average profit. 
                                                 
3 This is absent the possibility of adopting scale-complementing technologies, an issue that will 
be addressed later.  
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Note from eqn. (7) that the (partial, and not equilibrium) effect of an increase in P  on 
supply is 
(9) [ ] 2* 1 21 1 0 23 2 3 2
1 0
( )2( ) ( 1) 2 .cMNQ MN c K c P N
P P K P K
α α σα α α −∂ = − − − +∂  
This is certainly positive if 1 1 0 22( ) /[ ( 1)] /K N P cα α α− − ≥ .4 If either of 2 ( 1)Nα −  or /P c  are 
small, then positivity is assured. The first of these requirements is that the disease spillover be 
small. The second is due to *\nA  being large when /P c  is large. If 
* / 0Q P∂ ∂ ≥  for all P  in 
derivative (9), then there is a unique equilibrium price and quantity, given in fig. 1 as “initial 
equilibrium.”5 Note that, from eqn. (7) and 2 1α α≤ , supply is adversely affected by an increase 
in 2cσ  so that an increase in 2cσ  increases this unique equilibrium price and decreases this unique 
equilibrium quantity. Furthermore, (9) implies that * 1 2( / ) / 0Q P σ−∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ≤  so that an increase in 
2
cσ  shifts the inverse supply up and flattens it out, depicted in fig. 1 as the “shifted equilibrium.” 
Aggregate cost in the disease region is, from eqn. (5) and some computations,  
(10) 
2
* *
0
.
N
c
n nn
Nc a N a c
PK
σ
∈Ω = −∑  
Expression 2 0/( )cN PKσ−  is the cost-efficiency gain from expanding low-cost herds and 
contracting high-cost herds. It is the benefit associated with the production loss given by 
* * *
\Cov( ( ; ), )n n nN q a A a  in eqn. (7) above. So aggregate output and aggregate cost both decline 
with an increase in dispersion of unit costs. But output price effects need also to be taken into 
account. Evaluate sum (10) at equilibrium price and totally differentiate with respect to 2cσ ; 
                                                 
4 Remember, * / 0Q P∂ ∂ ≥  does not follow from the law of supply because that law is developed 
absent externalities. If 2 0α = , then externalities are absent and derivative (9) does indeed have a 
positive sign. 
5 The area under the supply response does not have the standard cost interpretation. 
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(11) 
22 *
* *
2 * 2 * 2 2 *
1 0 0
( ) ( ) .
[ ( )] [ ( )] ( )N
c
n nn
c c
Nd N c dQ Nc a P Q
d P Q K P Q K d P Q K
σ
σ σ∈Ω
⎛ ⎞ ′= + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
The price effects, i.e., the first right-hand expression, act to increase costs because an increase in 
output price will elicit larger expenditures on animal inputs. Thus, the direct and indirect effects 
have opposing signs. 
Turning to the welfare consequences of more cost dispersion, welfare measures are  
(12) 
0
*
*
0
(12 ) Consumer Surplus : ( ) ( ) ( ) ;
(12 ) Producer Surplus : ( ) ( ) ;
(12 ) Total Surplus : ( ) ( ) .
N
N
Qcon
pro
n nn
Qtot
n nn
a S Q P u du P Q Q
b S Q P Q Q M c a
c S Q P u du M c a
∈Ω
∈Ω
= −
= −
= −
∫
∑
∑∫
 
With *,eqQ  as the equilibrium market output level and *, *, *,( ) /[ ( )]eq eq eqd P Q Q P Qε ′=  as the 
demand elasticity, total derivatives are  
(13) 
*, *,
*, *,
2 2
**, *, *,
*, *, *,
2 2 2 2
**,
*, *,
2 2
*,
2
( )(13 ) ( ) ;
( )(13 ) ( ) ( )
(1 ) ( ) ;
( )(13 )
N
N
con eq eq
eq eq
c c
pro eq eq eq n nneq eq eq
c c c c
eq n nneq eq
d
c c
tot eq
c
dS Q dQa Q P Q
d d
d c adS Q dQ dQb Q P Q P Q M
d d d d
d c adQQ P Q M
d d
dS Qc
d
σ σ
σ σ σ σ
ε σ σ
σ
∈Ω
∈Ω
′= −
′= + −
′= + −
∑
∑
**,
*
2 2( ) .
N
eq n nn
c c
d c adQP Q M
d dσ σ
∈Ω= − ∑
 
It is immediate that consumer surplus declines with an increase in 2cσ  whenever the 
derivative in (9) is positive. The first expression between equality signs in (13b), involving 
*,( )eqP Q′ , is then positive. It is just a distribution effect and the distribution is away from 
consumers. If demand has unit elasticity, or 1dε = − , then the expression for producer surplus 
response simplifies to the negative of the cost response. But, in light of derivative (11), this cost 
response has an indeterminate sign. If output is very elastic, then the equilibrium price hardly 
moves and, using eqn. (7),  
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(14) 
**
* 2 1 1
2 2 * 2 * * 2
0 0 0
( )( ) 0.
( ) ( ) ( )
N
n nn
c c
d c a MN MNdQ MNP Q M
d d P Q K P Q K P Q K
α α α
σ σ
∈Ω −− ≈ + = ≥∑  
So total welfare and producer surplus both increase whenever the equilibrium price is not very 
sensitive to unit cost variance. However, the price response can be (in the absolute sense) 
arbitrarily large so that total surplus can decline with an increase in unit cost variance. 
Upon applying eqn. (5), the Herfindahl index for herd shares in a region is6 
(15) 
2* 2 2
1
* 2 * 2
0 0
1 ,
[ ( ) ]N
herd n c
n
a K
N a N NK P Q c
σ
α∈Ω
⎛ ⎞= = +⎜ ⎟ −⎝ ⎠∑H  
with derivative  
(16) 
2 2*
*0 1
2 * 2 2 * 2
0 0 0
21 ( ) .
[ ( ) ] [ ( ) ]
herd
c
c c
Kd dQP Q
d P Q c d NK P Q c
α σ
σ α σ α
⎛ ⎞′= −⎜ ⎟− −⎝ ⎠
H  
If the equilibrium price is not responsive to the variance of unit costs then the Herfindahl index 
for herd shares increases, as one would expect. This positive response is also the case whenever 
firms have common unit costs so that 2 0cσ =  at the point of evaluation. But there is also a price 
effect such that a higher price has a stronger effect on small farm stocking rates than on large 
farm stocking rates; see the comment under eqn. (5) above. It is conceivable that the price effect 
overwhelms the direct effect and the index declines. 
In summary:7  
RESULT 1. Let the sum of unit animal costs be held fixed, let all outputs remain interior, and let 
Nash equilibrium supply offered at any price be increasing in output price. Then an increase in 
the variance of unit stocking costs (a) decreases the equilibrium level of market output, and (b) 
increases equilibrium market price and decreases consumer surplus.  
                                                 
6 The Herfindahl index for production shares is not as straightforward. Then, since per animal 
output multiplies stock per farm, the skewness and kurtosis of unit stocking costs also matter. 
7 The interested reader should contrast this result with the effects of variance in unit costs on 
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If, in addition, the equilibrium price response to an increase in unit cost variance is 
sufficiently small then (c) all of producer surplus, total surplus, and the Hirfindahl index of herd 
concentration increase with an increase in the variance of unit stocking costs.  
 
The result asserts that, although aggregate output declines and animals can become 
increasingly concentrated in large herds when unit stocking costs become more dispersed, this 
can lead to an increase in social welfare. As will be developed upon later, larger herds are more 
cost efficient. Disease spillover concerns motivate these farms to stock less than they ought to 
given the region’s average stocking rate. Even so, more dispersion in unit stocking costs 
encourages more stocking by those farms that should stock more. The average stocking rate is 
not affected since the (interior) equilibrium stocking rate is linear in unit cost. 
From this point on the assumption is made that the equilibrium price is exogenous to the 
moments of unit stocking costs. This may be because a change in unit cost variance occurs in just 
one disease region or because the demand elasticity is very large. In order to reduce notation by 
omitting M , the perspective will be taken that the disease region is a small contributor to total 
market output. 
ASSUMPTION 1. Equilibrium price is not affected by the moments of unit stocking costs in a 
disease region that produces a small share of total market output. 
 
All of what will be asserted from this point on can be modified in the manner of Result 1 
above to account for an output price response. Considered next is the effect of a change in just 
one unit stocking cost. In the appendix the following is shown. 
RESULT 2. Under Assumption 1, a decrease in some farm unit stocking cost can decrease the sum 
of farm profits, increase the sum of farm costs, and decrease the sum of farm revenues. In 
                                                                                                                                                             
welfare in the standard Cournot oligopoly, as studied in Salant and Shaffer (1999). 
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particular, if ic  decreases and 
*
ia  is sufficiently close to zero then all of the above will occur. The 
sum of farm costs increases if / 2ic c< . 
 
The result brings out the importance of strategic interactions in the disease region. The sum 
of profits depends in two ways on the moments of nc . There is a component that depends only 
on the average of unit stocking costs. It is, of course, decreasing in average stocking cost. There 
is also a component that depends on the variance of unit stocking costs. Aggregate profit is 
increasing in variance because cost efficiencies due to animal concentration induced by cost 
dispersion outweigh the reduced level of aggregate output that arises when animals become more 
concentrated. A reduction in some ic  will reduce mean cost c  and it will reduce 
2
cσ  if ic  
exceeds c . If ic  is large enough, i.e., 
*
ia  is small enough, then the adverse impact on cost 
variability efficiencies can outweigh the positive impact on mean unit stocking cost. Taking a 
strategic perspective, when the small ith farm becomes more competitive then stock numbers 
decline among larger herds. Even though they are more diseased, larger herds internalize more of 
the disease externality and so the extent of economic losses due to disease increases with a 
decrease in ic . Of course, the adverse impact on profits could be due to revenue effects or cost 
effects. The result shows that it can be due to both.  
There is an antecedent to Result 2 in the oligopoly pricing literature. In the standard Cournot 
model with constant (but firm-specific) unit costs, Lahiri and Ono (1988) and Zhao (2001) have 
demonstrated that a decline in some firm’s unit cost can reduce industry profits and total surplus. 
Although the details differ, the reasoning is broadly the same. Large firms have low unit costs 
and so are efficient. Consumers benefit from a lower unit cost on the part of a small firm, but 
strategic interactions are such that production is diverted from low-cost producers toward that 
high-cost producer with the now lower unit cost. The welfare loss due to diverted production can 
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outweigh the welfare gain on the consumer side. In our case, aggregate output can fall so that it 
is not even necessarily true that the consumer is better off following the decline in the unit cost. 
 
First-Best 
By contrast with problem (4), growers behaving under first-best should take account of how they 
affect productivity on other farms in the disease region. First-best is when actions satisfy  
(17) 
1 2, , ... , \
max ( ; ) .
N N N
a a a n n n n nn n
P q a A a c a∈Ω ∈Ω−∑ ∑  
First-best optimality conditions identify choices ,fbi Na i∈Ω , satisfying  
(18) 
0 0
1 2 3 1 2 3
3 1 2
; .
2 ( ) 2 ( )
2 2 ( 1).
fb fb fbi i
i
c c P c c c P ca a a
P PK P PK
K N
α α
α α α α
α α
− − − −= + = + =− −
= + −
 
Note that  
(19) * 0 2
1 2 1 2
( ) ( 1) 0,
2 [2 ( 1)][ ( 1)]
fb P c Na a
P N N
α α
α α α α
− −− = ≥+ − + −  
i.e., animals are overstocked except when 2 0α = . This will be called the tragedy-of-the-
commons effect or simply the commons effect (Hardin 1968). Eqn. (18) and eqn. (5) imply  
(20) * * 2
1 2 1 2
( ) .
2 (2 )( )
fb fb i
i i
c ca a a a
P
α
α α α α
−− = − + − −  
Thus, * * 0fb fbi ia a a a− ≥ − ≥  whenever ic c≥ . In summary: 
RESULT 3. (a) On average, farms are overstocked, (b) * *( ) ( )fb fbi i isign a a a a sign c c− − + = − , 
and (c) if a farm’s unit stocking cost is larger than the average unit stocking cost then the Nash 
equilibrium stocking rate exceeds first-best.  
 
The result exhibits the tendency for high-cost farms to stock too heavily, but it leaves open 
the possibility that some farms are under-stocked relative to first-best. It can be seen from eqn. 
 14
(19) and eqn. (20) that this possibility can occur when ic c−  is sufficiently negative, e.g., when 
c  is large and 0ic = .  
Of course, stocking rates and outputs are not the same. In addition, (19) by itself does not 
imply that aggregate cost is lower under first-best. Output and cost levels satisfy the following:  
RESULT 4. (a) Aggregate output under first-best less aggregate output under Nash behavior is 
decreasing in the variance of unit stocking costs.  
(b) Aggregate output under first-best behavior is less than under Nash behavior if 
(21) 
2 2 * *
0 1 2 0 1 12
2 1 2
4 ( )( ) ( )( )
.
(4 3 )
fb fb
c
P K a a K a aα α α ασ α α α
⎡ ⎤− − − − +⎣ ⎦> −  
This is possible. 
(c) When compared with aggregate cost under Nash equilibrium, aggregate cost under first-best 
is always smaller. Furthermore, the difference in aggregate costs becomes more negative when 
the variance of unit stocking costs increases. 
 
Result 4 asserts that at least part of the efficiency gain on moving to first-best must come 
from cost efficiencies. These cost efficiencies are due to (a) reducing the average stocking rate 
and (b) shifting stock toward lower-cost farms; see Result 3 above. But output may fall under 
first-best because of the commons effect. In that case, and allowing for a downward-sloping 
demand curve, consumers would lose under first-best. Producers would gain from higher prices 
and, even absent higher prices, cost efficiencies adequate to offset lower production. If, though, 
the variance of unit stocking costs is so low that aggregate output increases slightly, then both 
consumer surplus and producer surplus are larger under first-best.8 
                                                 
8 A condition on 0/( )c Pα  is also required. The condition is explained under (A9) in the 
appendix.  
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Considered next is a policy intervention to support first-best. A stock, or poll, tax is used to 
ensure first-best actions by acting on *ia . Let the unit stocking cost, inclusive of the poll tax, be 
$
ic  so that the tax is 
$
i i ic cτ = − . The tax can come in two forms: (a) a farm-specific tax that takes 
account of the farm’s unit stocking costs, or (b) a farm-invariant tax. 
RESULT 5. (a) First-best is supported by a farm-specific animal poll tax of 
(22) 2 0 2
1 2 1 2
( ) ( ) ( 1); .
2( ) 2[ ( 1)]
i
i
c c P c N
N
α α ατ τ τα α α α
− − −= − ≡− + −  
Consequently, the first-best poll tax is larger on farms with higher unit stocking costs.  
(b) If an animal poll tax must be farm-invariant, then the conditional first-best tax is τ  as given 
in (22).  
(c) The welfare gain due to the ability to condition on the ic  is  
(23) 
2
1 2 1 2
2 2
1 2 2 1
(4 3 ) 0,
4 ( ) (2 )
cN
P
α α α α σ
α α α α
− >− −  
which is increasing in the variance of unit stocking costs.  
 
The first-best poll tax reduces the average stocking rate, and especially stocking rates in 
smaller herds. This is consistent with Result 3, and the differential tax on smaller herds arises 
because cost efficiencies in larger herds overcome at least some disease inefficiencies. Part (b) 
shows that the gains from conditioning on farm unit stocking costs are due only to the ability to 
spread effective costs out so as to better allocate stock across farms. From (6a) it is clear that the 
unweighted average output per animal does not depend on specific taxes. But the average, when 
weighted by herd size, decreases upon imposing the farm-specific poll tax. As for part (c), it is 
natural that the gain should depend on the variance of unit stocking costs because if 2 0cσ =  then 
farms do not differ and there should be no gain from exercising the capacity to tax farms 
differently. 
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Cost-Reducing Technology 
Studied next is how the endemic disease can affect technology adoption, feedlot scale, and the 
interaction between these farm decisions. A cost-reducing technology becomes available. Its 
adoption involves a variable cost component and a fixed cost component, i.e., that does not vary 
with the stocking rate. The technology can be adopted in varying amounts, which will be labeled 
as iz . The fixed cost incurred is 
20.5 iFz  per farm. There is also a variable cost incurred, at 1 izφ  
per animal with 1 0φ > . The benefit of adoption is that a farm’s variable costs decline from ic  to 
2i ic zφ− , 2 1φ φ> . Netting out, unit cost becomes i ic zδ− , 2 1δ φ φ= − . Notice that the lower-cost 
farms will have a stronger incentive to adopt because these farms have larger herds, i.e., scale 
complements the innovation.  
The game has two stages; in the first the level of the cost-reducing innovation is chosen and 
in the second the level of output is chosen. It is, of course, solved backwards and the strategic 
dimension arises because stage 1 choices affect the stage 2 stocking decisions of other farms. 
Instead of problem (4), the ith grower’s stage 2 optimization problem becomes  
(24) 20 1 2 \max max ( ) .i ia i a i i i i i i iP a P a P a A c z aπ α α α δ= − − − −  
From eqn. (5), the optimum feedlot scale is  
(25) * * * 0
0 1
; ; .N
nni i
i
zc z c z P c za a a z
PK PK N
δ δ α δ ∈Ω− − + − += + = = ∑  
So (6a) becomes  
(26) * * 1 1 0 2 1\ 0
1 0
( )( ) ( )( )( ; ) .i ii i
K P c z c z c zq a A
PK PK
α α δ α α δ δα − − + − − − += − +  
The stage 1 problem is then  
(27) * * * * 2\max ( ; ) ( ) 0.5 ,iz i i i i i i iPq a A a c z a Fzδ− − −  
with maximizing argument *iz  and optimality condition  
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(28) * *
\ \
* * * *
* * * * *\ \ \
\
\
* *
( ; ) ( ; )( ; )
0.
i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i ia a A A
i i
dq a A da dq a A dAPa Pq a A c z Pa
da dz dA dz
a Fz
δ
δ
= =
⎡ ⎤+ − + +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
+ − =
 
Since the term in square brackets is zero under Nash behavior, eqn. (28) reduces to 
(29) 
* * * * * *
* *\ \ \ \ 2
2* *
\ \ 0 1
( ; ) ( ; ) ( 1)0; ; ;i i i i i ii i
i i i i
dq a A dA dq a A dA NP a Fz
dA dz dA dz PK K
δαδ α⎡ ⎤ −+ − = = − = −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
or 
(30) 
* *
* *1 4 1 4 1 2
4
0 1
2 2 2 ( 2); ; .ii
K a K a Nz z K
F F K K
α δ α δ α α+ −= = =  
In light of eqn. (25) and eqn. (30), the means of solution values are 
(31) * *0 0 1 42 2
1 1 4 1 1 4
( ) 2( ); ;
2 2
P c F P c Ka z
PFK K PFK K
α α α δ
α δ α δ
− −= =− −  
which implies: 
RESULT 6. If ( )1 1 40, /(2 )PFK Kδ α∈ , then average stocking rate and average extent of adoption 
of the cost-reducing technology are (a) increasing in unit innovation benefit δ  and (b) 
decreasing in fixed-cost parameter F .  
 
The result holds that the two decisions facing the farm are, in a sense, complements. While 
cost function ( )i i ic z aδ− −  suggests a complementary relationship between stocking rate and 
extent of technology adoption, bear in mind that stocking decisions by other farms do not 
complement the own-farm stocking decision. So an increase in δ  could conceivably have 
adverse indirect consequences for a farm. Thus, the unambiguous nature of Result 6 is somewhat 
surprising.  
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Turning to adoption decisions on particular farms, eqn. (25) and eqn. (30) imply  
(32) * * * * 1 42 2
0 1 4 0 1 4
( ) 2( ); .
2 2
i i
i i
c c F c c Ka a z z
PFK K PFK K
α δ
α δ α δ
− −− = − =− −  
It is immediate that *Cov( , ) 0n na c ≤ , *Cov( , ) 0n nz c ≤ , and * *Cov( , ) 0n na z ≥ , i.e., the two actions 
correlate positively across farms. A large herd absent the innovation begets a larger herd in the 
presence of the innovation. Another way of characterizing this relation is to consider the 
restriction * ˆi Nz z i= ∀ ∈Ω . In that case, eqn. (32) becomes * * 0( ) /[ ]i ia a c c PK− = −  so that  
(33) 
2 2
* *
2ˆ
0 0 1 4
Cov( , ) Cov( , ) ,
2 /
c c
n n n nz z
N Na c a c
PK PK K F
σ σ
α δ= = ≤ =−  
and feedlot scale becomes less responsive under imposition of the constraint. Summarizing:  
RESULT 7. If ( )0 1 40, /(2 )PFK Kδ α∈ , then (a) any farm with initial unit stocking cost lower 
(higher) than average both (i) stocks and (ii) invests more (less) than the average farm so that 
*Cov( , ) 0n na c ≤ , *Cov( , ) 0n nz c ≤ , and * *Cov( , ) 0n na z ≥ ; (b) relative to covariance between 
stocking rate and unit stocking cost when z  is imposed at some value zˆ , the capacity to choose 
the value of iz  increases the absolute value of this covariance.  
 
This result conveys that the availability of technology choices with a variable-for-fixed cost 
trade-off will act to increase the dispersion of feedlot scale. Turning next to how investment 
under Nash behavior compares with first-best investment levels, the first-best problem is to  
(34) 
1 2
1 2
2
, , ... , \
, , ... ,
max ( ; ) ( ) 0.5 .
N N N N
N
a a a n n n n n n nn n n
z z z
P q a A a c z a F zδ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω− − −∑ ∑ ∑  
Upon adapting eqn. (18), first-best optimality conditions identify choices ,fbi Na i∈Ω , that satisfy 
(35) 0
1 2 3
( ) ( ) ; ; .
2 ( )
fb fb fb fb
fb fb fb fbi i i
i i
c z c z P c z aa a a z
P PK F
δ δ α δ δ
α α
− − − − += + = =−  
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A comparison with (28)-(30) reveals that an effect is absent. This effect represents the 
strategic effort to manipulate the stocking decisions on the part of other herds. The solution of 
system (35) for means is  
(36) 0 02 2
3 3
( ) ( ); .fb fbP c F P ca z
PFK PFK
α α δ
δ δ
− −= =− −  
Comparisons with averages under Nash equilibrium provide 
(37) 
2
* 1 2 1 1 2
2 02 2
0 1 1 1 4 3
[2 ( 1)] 2 [2 ( 2) ( 3)( 1)] ( ) .
( 2 )( )
fb N N N Nz z P c PF
K K PFK K PFK
α α α α α α α δα δ δ
+ − + − + − −− = −− −  
It follows, from evaluation at 0δ =  and also a straightforward derivation, that (a) 
*
0 0| |
fbz zδ δ= == , and (b) * / /fbd z d d z dδ δ≥  whenever * 0z >  and 0fbz > .  
RESULT 8. The average level of technology adoption is socially excessive. 
 
Similar to the above, Elberfeld (2003) identified socially excessive technology adoption for 
firms in Cournot oligopoly with ex ante identical unit production costs. The intuition for Result 8 
is that farms know that low costs on their own part will deter other farms from choosing high 
stocking rates. So there is a strategic motive for each farm to increase the extent of technology 
adoption.9 In the end, of course, farmers are unlikely to be better off because stocking rates and 
disease losses increase with the mean level of technology adoption.  
The above technology choice has nothing to do with disease management, and it cannot 
explain why larger farms could have higher output per animal. The next section presents a 
disease management technology that can explain this phenomenon. 
 
Biosecurity Technology 
Considered is a biosecurity innovation that comes at a cost. If the firm pays amount 20.5 iFz , then 
the extent of negative spillover changes from \ iA  to \i iA z− . As before, the game is played in 
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two stages. The biosecurity innovation choice level is made at stage 1 and the scale choice is 
made at stage 2. Solving backwards, the stage 2 problem for the ith farm is  
(38) 20 1 2 \max max ( ) .i ia i a i i i i i i iP a P a P a A z c aπ α α α= − − − −  
The stage 2 choice satisfies 
(39) 0 2 1 2 \2 0.i i i iP P z P a P A cα α α α+ − − − =  
This aggregates as before in Nash equilibrium except that 0Pα  is replaced by 0 2 iP P zα α+ , and 
eqn. (5) becomes 
(40) * 0 2 0 1 2 1 1 2
1 0
; 2 ; 2 ( 1).i ii
P P z c c ca K K N
PK PK
α α α α α α+ − −= + ≡ − ≡ + −  
Similar to eqn. (28), the stage 1 optimization problem is  
(41) 
*
0 0 1 1
* * *
* * * * *\ \
\ 2
( ; ) ( ; ) 1 0,
i i
i i i i
i i i i i i
i i ia a
dq a A da dAPa Pq a A c Pa Fz
da dz dz
α
= = − =−
=
⎡ ⎤ ⎛ ⎞+ − − − − =⎢ ⎥ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
???????????????? ?????
 
or  
(42) * *2 .i iPa Fzα =  
Relation (42), similar to (30), confirms the complementary relationship between the two farm-
level choices. This and eqn. (40) imply  
(43) * * 1 2
0 1 2
( ) .
( )
i
i
c c FKa a
PK FK Pα
−− = −  
Deviation in output per animal from mean output per animal is  
(44) 
2
* * * * * * * * * 2
\ 1 2 2 2 1( ; ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ,i i i i i
Pq a A q a a z z a a
F
αα α α α α⎡ ⎤− = − − − − − = − − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
so that * * 22 1 2Cov( , ) /
sign
n nq a P Fα α α= − + . 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 This is an example of a closed-loop equilibrium; see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 132). 
 21
RESULT 9. If 22 1 2( ) ( )P Fα α α> < − , then farms with above-average herd size have above-average 
(below-average) output per animal.  
 
So if the fixed-cost parameter is sufficiently low or output price is sufficiently high then 
Result 9 is consistent with the data reported in tables 1 and 2. The biosecurity effect dominates 
the adverse own-scale effect. But if F  is large, perhaps early on in the history of confined 
agriculture for a particular species, then the own-scale effect will dominate. In particular, in the 
limit as F →∞  then * 0i Nz i= ∀ ∈Ω  and the model in this section reduces to the model studied 
at the outset. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has developed a model that explains relationships between regional animal disease 
spillovers, farm feedlot scale, farm output per animal, and technology adoption decisions. It 
places some curiosities on sound microeconomic foundations. For example, high-cost farms can 
have high productivity in the sense of output per animal while also having comparatively low 
profits. A second example is that an increase in the variability of unit stocking costs may well 
induce lower aggregate output but higher social welfare. A third example is that a per animal 
subsidy to smaller herds will increase the region’s overall stocking rate and reduce the region’s 
aggregate farm profits, but a subsidy to larger herds will increase farm profits over the region. 
This inference suggests caution when developing public policy on animal health. It is also shown 
that, because of disease externalities, there may be excessive adoption of a cost-reducing 
technology. In addition, the availability of a biosecurity-improving technology can explain why 
larger herds can produce more output per animal.  
Many of the propositions are testable. Farm-level data could explain the relationship 
between unit stocking costs, output per animal, and biosecurity measures taken. Losinger et al. 
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(1998) provide a summary of how United States National Animal Health Monitoring System 
(NAHMS) data on hog mortality relate to biosecurity measures taken. If this sort of data, 
together with production data for the same farms, were available then empirical tests could be 
completed. In addition, if relevant time-series data over the course of several decades could be 
obtained then the following could be tested for. When a biosecurity technology is first 
commercialized, as with antibiotics in feed during the 1950s, the technology should be adopted 
most extensively on larger feedlots. But the correlation between feedlot scale and output per 
animal should be either negative or weakly positive. As the cost of the technology declines, then 
it should still be the case that larger herds adopt more extensively, but the correlation between 
scale and output per animal should increase to become more strongly positive.  
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Table 1. Summary of ARMS 2000 Dairy Survey Data 
                                                                                      Enterprise Size 
Summary statistic, all are averages Small 
< 50 cows
Medium 
50-99 
Large 
100-499 
Industrial 
≥ 500 
Herd size 33 88 313 955 
Output/cow (lb/year) 14,932 16,157 17,420 17,326 
Labor efficiency (hours/100 lb milk) 0.84 0.44 0.19 0.11 
Feed efficiency(lb feed/100 lb milk) 243 252 317 162 
bST use (% of milk cows) 8 10 17 22 
Genetic selection/breeding program 
    (Yes=1, No=0) 
0.56 0.68 0.70 0.89 
Preventive medicine practices 
    (Yes=1, No=0) 
0.86 0.94 0.93 0.97 
Veterinary expenses ($/100 lb milk) 0.66 0.71 0.58 0.60 
 
Note: Data are as reported in tables 4 and 5 of Short (2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Pigs per Litter by Size of Operation, by Quarter 
                                                                      Pigs per litter on operations having head 
Year Quarter 1- 
99 
100- 
499 
500- 
999 
1,000-
1,999 
2,000-
4,999 
≥ 
5,000 
Dec ’95-Feb ’96 6.9 7.8 7.9 8.4 8.8 NA 1996 
Mar ’96-May ’96 7.6 8.1 8.2 8.5 8.7 NA 
Dec ’00-Feb ’01 7.5 7.8 8.2 8.5 8.7 8.9 2001 
Mar ’01-May ’01 7.6 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.9 9.0 
Dec ’05-Feb ’06 7.5 8.0 8.3 8.8 9.0 9.1 2006 
Mar ’06-May ’06 7.6 8.0 8.4 8.8 9.0 9.2 
 
Note: Data are from Quarterly Hogs and Pigs reports by the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service, release dates 6/28/96, 6/29/01, and 6/30/06. In 1996, the largest size category was 
≥ 5,000, i.e., the last two columns merge for that year. 
 
 
 27
Appendix 
Proof of Result 2: Taking price as fixed, eqn. (7) and eqn. (10) establish that the sum of producer 
profits within a region is 
(A1) 
2 2
0 1
2 2
1 0
( ) .
N
c
nn
P c N
K K P
α σ απ∈Ω
⎡ ⎤−= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  
Differentiate with respect to some ic  and use eqn. (5) to obtain 
(A2) 
**
1 2
*
0 1 2
2 .
2 ( 1)
N
nn i
i
d aN a
dc K N N a
π α α
α α
∈Ω ⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟+ −⎝ ⎠
∑
 
Furthermore,  
(A3) 
* *
* *
0
.N
N
n nn n i
i n in
i i
d c a da ca c a
dc dc PK
∈Ω
∈Ω= + = −
∑ ∑  
This means that  
(A4) 
* * * *
\
** *
* *1 1 01 2 1 2
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
( ; )
2 22 2 .
N N N
n n n n n nn n n
i i i
i i i
i i
d q a A a d d c a
P
dc dc dc
a c K cN a N aa a
K K K PK K K K PK
π
α αα α α α
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω= −
⎛ ⎞+= − − + = − +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∑ ∑ ∑
 
When * 0ia = , then (A2) and (A4) take positive values while (A3) takes a negative value. Also, 
use (A3) and eqn. (5) to write * 0 0 1 0/( ) ( ) /( ) ( 2 ) /( )i i ia c PK P c PK c c PKα− = − + − , which is 
positive whenever / 2 ic c> .   » 
Proof of Result 4: Eqn. (1) and eqn. (18) imply 
(A5) 
1 1 0
\ 0
3
2
0 0 1 1 0 0
\ 2 2 2
3 3 3
2
0 1 1 0
2 2
1 2 3 1 2 1 2
( )( )( 5 ) ( ; ) ;
2
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( 5 ) ( ; )
2
( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) .
2 ( ) 2 ( ) 4 ( )
fb fb i
i i
fb fb fb i
i i i
i i i
K P c c cA a q a A
PK P
P c K P c c c P cA b q a A a
PK P K P K
c c K P c c c c c
P P K P
α αα
α α α α α
α α α
α α α α α α
− − −= − +
− − − − −= − −
− − − − −+ − −− − −
 
Upon summing (A5b) over farms, aggregate output in the disease region is 
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(A6) 
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0 0 1 1 0
\ 2 2 2
3 3 1 2
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α α α α σ
α α∈Ω
− − −= − − −∑  
Aggregate output is \( ; )
N
fb fb fb fb
n n nn
Q M q a A a∈Ω= ∑ . At a given output price, the difference 
between aggregate output under first-best and that under Nash equilibrium is  
(A7) 
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where eqn. (20) has been used. Part (a) is immediate from (A7). For part (b), the sign of 
*
0 1 1( )( )
fbK a aα α− − +  is needed. Calculate  
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so that  
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Now 1 2 1 2[4 3 ( 1)]/[4 2 ( 1)] 1N Nα α α α+ − + − > . Also, 01 /( ) (0,1)c Pα− ∈  with any of these 
values possible. So values of 0/( )c Pα  can be chosen such that *0 1 1( )( )fbK a aα α− − +  is 
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positive or negative. Since 2 0cσ =  is admissible, it follows that *fbQΔ  can be positive or 
negative.  
On part (c), the difference in average cost, first-best less Nash, is  
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where eqn. (20) and inequality (19) have been used. Clearly, 2* / 0
fb
cd C dσΔ ≤ .   » 
Proof of Result 5: For part (a), see eqn. (5) and eqn. (18) to confirm that the requirement is  
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Aggregation supports  
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This is the average poll tax τ  that needs to be imposed. Insert into (A11) to obtain 
(A13) 
$ $
$ 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
( ) .
2 2( ) 2( )
i i i
i i
c c c c c cc c ατα α α α α α
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − −= ⇒ − = −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 
Part (b): The problem is to identify some τ  that solves the following constrained problem: 
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Using (5) and (6b), the problem can be posed as  
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Being a quadratic optimization problem, any interior solution is unique. Differentiate and 
evaluate at *τ : 
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as specified in eqn. (22). Insert this into the objective function in (A15) to obtain 
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On the other hand, a farm-specific tax maps cost deviations to  
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Aggregate profits under this scenario amount to  
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The difference in aggregated profits, (A19) less (A17), is  
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as reported.   » 
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Figure 1. Demand and supply if supply increases in price
*Q(0,0)
*( )P Q Initial equilibrium
Shifted equilibrium, at 
higher unit cost variance
 
